An Indel-Resistant Error-Correcting Code for DNA-Based Information
  Storage by Press, William H. & Hawkins, John A.
An Indel-Resistant Error-Correcting Code for
DNA-Based Information Storage
W.H. Press and J.A. Hawkins
Institute for Computational Engineering and Sciences
University of Texas at Austin
December 5, 2018
1 Introduction
Engineered DNA is an information channel. One can convert an arbitrary
message into a string of DNA characters, or bases, {A,C,G, T}, synthesize
the string into a physical DNA sample; store or transport the sample through
space and time; sequence it back to a string of characters; and then hope to
recover exactly the original message. Because errors are introduced during all
the stages of synthesis, storage, and sequencing, it is necessary to utilize an
error-correcting code (ECC) at the stage of converting message bits to DNA
characters (encoding), and then later, when DNA characters are converted
back to message bits (decoding). The ECC needs to correct three kinds of
errors: substitutions of one base by another, spurious insertions of bases, and
deletions of bases from the message. Insertions and deletions are commonly
termed “indels”.
The correction of substitutions is a standard problem in coding theory,
where substitutions are termed “errors”. The overarching theoretical frame-
work for coding theory starts with Shannon [1], and there exist hundreds, if
not thousands, of well studied error-correcting codes (ECCs) [2, 3, 4, 5]. How-
ever, established methods for error correction in the case of silent deletions—
termed deletion channels—are few; and there are virtually no established
methods for channels with all three of deletions, insertions, and substitu-
tions. (See [6] and [7] for reviews and references.) Indeed, no approaches
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suggested in the literature are well suited to DNA applications [8]. For ex-
ample, almost all attention has been on binary channels, while the DNA
channel is quaternary.
As the main contribution of this paper, we describe in Section 4 a method
for encoding a stream of arbitrary message bits onto a stream of DNA char-
acters with an ECC that simultaneously corrects all three kinds of errors.
Our ECC, which we call HEDGES (for “Hash Encoded, Decoded by Greedy
Exhaustive Search”), is tuned to recover character-by-character message syn-
chronization, even at the cost of leaving a small number of uncorrected sub-
stitution errors . This tuning makes HEDGES useful as the “inner” code
(closest to the channel and applied last in encoding) in a concatenated code
design, leaving it to a conventional “outer” code (applied first in encoding,
last in decoding) to correct any remaining substitution errors. Below, in
combination with HEDGES, we will use the standard Reed-Solomon (R-S)
code [9] denoted RS(255,223). R-S codes are completely intolerant of indels,
i.e., they require perfectly synchronized input.
Because of our tuning of HEDGES for use in a concatenated design, it will
be useful to first describe a possible full system design (Section 3), and only
then describe HEDGES in detail (Section 4). The system design in Section
3 is illustrative but not unique. HEDGES itself, as a quaternary-alphabet
indel-resistant ECC, is general and can readily be utilized in other overall
designs.
2 Related Work
There is a growing body of experimental work on DNA information storage,
employing various strategies for dealing with errors. We summarize chrono-
logically some of the previous work as it relates to this paper.
Church et. al [10] synthesized oligomers of length 159, each of which con-
tained both address information (ordering of oligomers in the message) and
payload. There was no explicit ECC. The pool of oligomers was sequenced
to a depth 3000x, allowing recovery of a consensus sequence with high prob-
ability. High-depth coverage can correct sequencing errors, but not synthesis
errors. Indeed, the final results contained 10-bit errors.
Goldman et. al [11] synthesized oligos with 3/4 of each strand overlapping
the previous strand, in effect a 4x repetition code. Each strand had parity
check bits for error detection (but not correction). A ternary code (ternary
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message alphabet to quaternary DNA alphabet) was utilized to avoid ho-
mopolymers. Error correction was done by sequencing to high depth and
filtering for, and aligning, perfectly sequenced fragments. The final results
contained two gaps where none of the four overlapping sequences were recov-
ered.
Grass et. al [12] implemented interleaved Reed-Solomon codes for DNA
storage. Message bits were converted to characters in the 47-character alpha-
bet GF(47), with interleaved correction in blocks of (713 × 39) characters.
An inner code mapped GF(47) characters to 47 DNA trimers chosen to guar-
antee no homopolymers of length > 3 in the final DNA message, but with no
other redundancy. Indels were corrected by sequencing at sufficient depth to
reject faulty strands.
Bornholt et. al [13] introduced strand-to-strand redundancy by creating
strand C = A ⊕ B (or other redundant combinations), where ⊕ denotes
exclusive-or, and utilizing majority dedoding. Parity check bits allowed the
filtering out of faulty strands. There was no explicit correction of indels.
Erlich and Zielinski [14] utilized quite a different overall architecture,
based on fountain codes. Fountain codes send linear combinations of portions
of a message in “droplets”, such that one can recover the original message by
the solution of linear equations. The included redundancy allows the loss of
some droplets. R-S coding was used within each oligomer droplet for error
detection but not correction. Faulty droplets, including any with indels, were
rejected.
Yazdi et. al [15] leveraged the multiple sequence alignment capabilities of
several sophisticated packages in conjunction with a custom homopolymer
check code to correct the large error rates—especially homopolymer errors—
associated with MinION nanopore sequencing. Sequencing depths were in
the range of several hundred.
In the largest-scale experiment to date, Organick et. al [16] encoded and
recovered, error-free, more than 200 MB of data. R-S coding was used across
strands, with no explicit error correction within a strand. Substitutions and
indels within a strand were corrected by multiple alignment and consensus
calling. Coverage was 5x for high-quality Illumina sequencing, rising to 36x
to 80x required for Nanopore technology.
To summarize, while previous work has adopted increasingly sophisti-
cated system designs, there has been little progress in the fundamental prob-
lem of correcting indels within a single strands. The use of sequencing to
large depth, followed by multiple alignment, is in effect a use of the oldest,
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Figure 1: The overall system design is a concatenated code with interleaving
across 255 strands of DNA (horizontal lines in the figure). Each strand is
protected by HEDGES, this paper’s indel-correcting code. HEDGES restores
synchronization, so that the packet can then be protected against residual
errors and missing strands by a Reed-Solomon code (applied diagonally, as
shown, for reasons described in the text).
simplest, and arguably least efficient ECC, namely a simple repetition code,
sending the same message multiple times and taking the consensus. This
manifests itself as sequencing stored DNA to high coverage, finding sets of
reads which appear to derive from the same intended sequence, and either
merging the reads into a consensus sequence and/or filtering out any reads
which fail some quality check. Though this is a central part of previously
implemented DNA error-correction schemes, it also tends to be left unac-
counted for in claims for code efficiency. The central result in this paper is a
technique for correcting substitutions and indels in a single strand, i.e., when
sequenced to no more than depth one.
4
3 Example System Design
For cost and efficiency, both DNA synthesis and DNA sequencing employ
massive parallelism. That is, many short sequences, each of length hundreds
to thousands of bases, are written (synthesized) or read (sequenced) simul-
taneously. While the length of a single synthesis or read will increase as
technology improves, it is unlikely that the great advantage of parallelism
will ever be superceded. This being the case, the basic units of our system
design are individual strands of length 102–104.
To connect with our use of RS(255,223), we define a “DNA packet” as an
ordered set of 255 DNA strands. When any one strand in the set is decoded
with HEDGES, it produces a message fragment of length L bytes (say), now
having high probability of being perfectly synchronized. Each 255 correctly
ordered message fragments form a “message packet”, as illustrated in Figure
1. There can be any number of message packets in a total communication.
The Reed-Solomon code is applied across the strands (interleaved). This
enables it to protect against missing strands—“erasures” to coding theorists—
as well as correcting any residual substitution errors that were not corrected
by HEDGES. Different from previous investigations, we apply the R-S code
diagonally across the strands (see Figure). This increases the resistance to
any failure of synthesis or sequencing to produce full-length strands. It also
ameliorates the effect of the observed tendency for error rates to be higher
at the ends of strands.
It is an important point that the Reed-Solomon code can only be ap-
plied after the strands in a packet are identified as being from one particular
packet (out of an assumed pool of many packets, perhaps millions) and are
correctly ordered. This implies that a packet’s identification number and a
strand’s serial number within the packet (both shown as shaded green in the
Figure) cannot themselves be R-S protected. We will instead protect them
by a different technique (“salt protection”) that is described in Section 4.4.
Salt protection has the effect of turning uncorrectable errors in the identifi-
cation/serial bytes into erasures in the message bytes—which are correctable
by R-S.
Summarizing, here are the main points that affect the design of HEDGES
as an inner code: (1) We don’t need to decode strands of arbitrary length, but
only of some known uncorrupted length L. (2) Recovering synchronization
has the highest priority. (3) Known erasures are less harmful than unknown
substitutions, because R-S can correct twice as many erasures as substitution
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errors. (4) Burst errors within a single byte are less harmful than distributed
bit errors, because R-S corrects a byte at a time. (5) Within the R-S code’s
capacity for byte errors and erasures, residual errors will be fully corrected
by the outer code, yielding an error-free message.
4 HEDGES, an Indel-Correcting Code
4.1 Overall Strategy
Given a message stream of bits
bi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M, bi ∈ {0, 1} (1)
(“the message” or “bits”), we want to emit a stream of DNA characters
Ci, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N, Ci ∈ {A,C,G, T} ≡ {0, 1, 2, 3}
(“the codestream” or “characters”). We first describe the case of a half-rate
code, where we emit exactly one Ci (2 bits of output) for each bi (1 bit of
input). In section 4.5 we generalize to codes at other rates r (message bits
per codestream bit), 0 < r < 1, so that the streams bi and Ci are not then
in lockstep, and M 6= N . One should think of N as being on the order of
102 to 104, the maximum length of a single DNA strand that can be cheaply
synthesized today or in the foreseeable future.
We want to be able to decode without residual errors a received code-
stream C ′ that differs from C by substitutions (errors), insertions, and dele-
tions (collectively “indels”). Indels are silent: their positions in the code-
stream C ′ are not known to the receiver.
The basic plan is a variant of a centuries-old cryptographic technique,
“text auto-key encoding” [17]. We generate a keystream of characters Ki ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}, where each Ki depends pseudorandomly (but deterministically by
a hash function) on some number of previous message bits bj (with j < i),
and also directly on the bit position index i. (We can initialize the previous
bits by defining bj ≡ 0 when j < 0.) We then emit a codestream character
Ci = Ki + bi, the addition performed modulo 4. In the terminology of
modern code theory, this scheme would be called a type of “tree code” or,
more specifically, an “infinite constraint-length convolutional code”.
The redundancy necessary for error correction comes from the fact that bi
takes on only two values, whileKi and Ci can have four values. This generates
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(only) one bit of redundancy per character, i.e., can be acausally valid by
chance half the time. However, the dependence of Ki on many previous
message bits ties any given message bit to many future bits of redundancy.
Similarly, the dependence of Ki on i ties every bit to its position index, so
that (as we will see) insertions can be identified and removed, and deleted
values can be restored.
What is not obvious is that a codestream thus generated can actually be
practically decoded, especially in the presence of errors and indels at signifi-
cant rates. We will show by numerical simulation that it can be, remarkably
easily, essentially by guessing successive message bits and scoring against the
likelihood of the codestream under the guessed hypothesis. Wrong guesses
will be rejected by implying exponentially small downstream likelihoods. In
coding theory, this general technique is known as “sequential decoding”.
4.2 Encoding Algorithm
Elaborating slightly on the above description, let Si denote an arbitrary s-bit
value (“salt”) that can depend on i but is known to both sender and receiver,
Si = known ∈ Z⊗s2
Denote the low-order q bits of the bit position index i by
Ii ≡ i (mod 2q)
Let Bi denote the r previous concatenated bits
Bi ≡ [bi−rbi−r+1 · · · bi−1] ∈ Z⊗r2
Finally, let F (S, I, B) be a deterministic hash function from r+ q+ s bits to
2 bits
F (S, I, B) : Z⊗(r+q+s)2 → Z4
Then the formula for encoding is
Ci = Ki + bi = F (Si, Ii, Bi) + bi (mod 4) (2)
Figure 2 shows the algorithm graphically.
Typical values that we use are r = 8, q = 10, s = 46, so that r +
q + s = 64 bits, a convenient value for input to the hash. For the hash
function we use the low order 2 bits from the Numerical Recipes [18] function
Ranhash.int64(), because it is very fast and will occur in the inner loop of
the decode algorithm.
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Figure 2: The basic HEDGES encoding algorithm is a variant of plaintext
auto-key, but with redundancy introduced because (in the case of a half-rate
code, e.g.) one bit of input produces two bits of output.
4.3 Decoding Algorithm
For simplicity, assume that error rates are “small”, so that “most” DNA
bases are received as they were intended. (We will see in Section 5 that
DNA character error rates up to ∼ 5%–10% are tolerable.) Suppose we have
correctly decoded and synchronized the message through bit bi−1 and now
want to know bit bi. Guessing the two possibilities, {0, 1}, we use equation
(2) to predict two possibilities for the character Ci. In the absence of an error,
only one of these is guaranteed to agree with the observed character C ′i. We
assign to a guess that generates disagreement with C ′i a penalty score equal
(conceptually) to the negative log probability of observing a substitution
error. In other words, a wrong guess might actually be right, but only if
a substitution has occurred. If neither guess produces the correct Ci, then
both are assigned the substitution penalty.
We have not yet accounted for the possibility of insertions and deletions,
however. In fact, there are more than the above two possible guesses. We
must guess not just bi ∈ {0, 1}, but also a “skew” ∆ ∈ {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .} that
tells us whether in comparing C to C ′ we should skip characters (∆ > 0) be-
cause of insertions, or posit missing characters (∆ < 0) because of deletions
(in which case there is no comparison to be done). As a practical simplifi-
cation we consider only ∆ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. (We comment on this simplification
in Section 4.6.) Then there are six guesses for (bi,∆) ∈ {0, 1} ⊗ {−1, 0, 1}.
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Each can be scored by an appropriate log probability penalty for any implied
substitution, insertion, or deletion.
Log probability penalties accumulate additively along any chain of guesses.
In the causal case of a chain of all-correct guesses, we accumulate penalties
only in the (relatively rare) case of actual errors. However, because of the
way that the key Ki (equation (2)) is constructed, single wrong guess for
either bi, i, or ∆ throws us into the acausal case where 3/4 of subsequent
comparisons of computed C (at some bit position index i) to observed C ′ (at
some index k) will not agree—thus penalties will accumulate rapidly. The
decoding problem, conceptually a maximum likelihood search, thus reduces
to a shortest-path search in a tree with branching factor 6, but with the
saving grace that the correct path will be much shorter than any deviation
from it.
Figure 3: The HEDGES decoding algorithm is a greedy search on an expand-
ing tree of hypotheses. Each hypothesis simultaneously guesses a message bit
bi, its bit position index i, and its corresponding character position index k.
While the tree can in principle grow exponentially, a “greediness parameter”
Pok (see text) limits its growth: Most spawned nodes are never revisited.
We can formalize the above discussion as follows. Let H:= [i, bi, Bi, k]
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denote the joint hypothesis that the values i, bi, Bi are all correct and syn-
chronize to the observed codestream character C ′k through equation (2). As
a node in the search tree, the hypothesis H:= [i, bi, Bi, k] spawns six child
hypotheses, each of which can be scored with additional penalty ∆P (to be
added to their common parent’s accumulated penalty) as follows:
H:= [i+ 1, {0, 1}, Bi+1, k] : ∆P = Pdel
H:= [i+ 1, {0, 1}, Bi+1, k + 1] : ∆P = (Pok if C = C ′ else Psub)
H:= [i+ 1, {0, 1}, Bi+1, k + 2] : ∆P = (Pins + Pok if C = C ′ else Pins + Psub)
(3)
Here Psub, Pins, Pdel can be thought of as respectively the log probability
penalties for substitution, insertion, or deletion errors (but see Section 4.6).
Pok is the penalty or, if negative, reward, for an agreement between the
computed and received codestream characters C and C ′. In the comparison
notated above as C = C ′, the index of C is the first parameter in the hy-
pothesis H, while the index of C ′ is the last parameter in H. Note that a
child node’s Bi+1 is always computable from its parent’s Bi and bi.
How can we practically search this huge tree? A conceptual starting point
is the famous A* search algorithm [19], a best-first (that is, “greedy”) search
utilizing a heap data structure. A* assigns a heuristic cost to every node that
is the sum of its actual cost plus a quantity less than or equal to the smallest
possible additional cost that it can incur in reaching the goal. (For a tree
of constant depth, this is equivalent to adding a reward for every step taken
closer to the leaf nodes, i.e., a negative constant Pok above.) Figure 3 shows
the logical flow of an A* search, and also the HEDGES decode algorithm. As
already remarked, in coding theory, this kind of decoding strategy is called
“sequential decoding”.
Provably, A* always finds the best path. For our application, unfortu-
nately, it is exponentially slow, because actual errors along the true path
cause too many spawned hypotheses to be revisited; and because its termi-
nation criterion is too restrictive, again leading to too many spawned hy-
potheses.
To ameliorate these problems we make two heuristic modifications of A*:
First, we allow Pok to be more negative than that sanctioned by A* and tune
its value heuristically. While we thus lose the guarantee of finding exactly
the shortest path, we heuristically encourage the search not to revisit earlier
hypotheses after a sufficiently lengthy run of successes along one particular
chain. Second, we adopt a “first past the post” termination criterion. That
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is, the first chain of hypotheses to decode the required L bytes of message
wins. It is not obvious (or, by us, provable) that these heuristics should result
in a workable or efficient algorithm, but we will demonstrate by numerical
experiment that it does.
4.4 Use of Salt to Protect Critical Message
Above, we noted the importance of protecting message bits that determine
the ordering or “serial number” of strands for the outer, concatenated Reed-
Solomon code. In equation (2) (and Figure 2) we allowed for some number
of bits of known salt Si when message bit bi is encoded. Here is how this
salt is enabling of extra protection: Suppose we want to protect an initial n
message bits. Then define recursively the salt by
S0 = 0
Si = Si−1bi, i = 1, . . . , n− 1 (denoting concatenation)
Si = Si−1, i ≥ n
(4)
Most errors in the first n bits will be corrected as usual by the shortest-path
heap search. But any residual error that gets through will “poison” the salt
for the entire rest of the strand, rendering it undecodable. In effect we convert
an error in the protected bits into an erasure of the whole strand. This may
seem drastic, but it is just what we want: An strand with incorrect serial
number (and hence incorrect ordering among other strands) would look like
a strand of errors (with probablility 255/256 per byte) to the outer R-S; an
erased strand is equivalent to only half as many errors.
4.5 Code Rates Other than One-Half
A simple modification of the encode and decode algorithms described in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 allows for code rates other than one-half. Take the
input bitstream of expression (1) and partition it into a stream of values vk
with variable numbers of bits in the range 0 to 2, according to a repetitive
pattern like the ones shown in Table 1.
Here are two examples showing how to interpret the entries in Table 1
(with adjacency denoting two-bit values in Z4):
Rate 0.750: v0 = b0b1, v1 = b2, v2 = b3b4, v3 = b5, . . .
Rate 0.250: v0 = b0, v1 = 0, v2 = b1, v3 = 0, . . .
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Code Rate Pattern Pok (see text)
0.750 2, 1, 2, 1, . . . −0.035
0.600 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, . . . −0.082
0.500 1, 1, . . . −0.127
0.333 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, . . . −0.229
0.250 1, 0, 1, 0, . . . −0.265
0.166 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, . . . −0.324
Table 1: Mapping of bits bi to variable-bits vi for various code rates
Equation (2) for encoding now becomes
Ci = Ki + vi = F (Si, Ii, Vi) + vi (mod 4) (5)
where Vi is composed of concatenated previous variable bits. Pattern values
of 0 provide one bit of additional redundancy check relative to the base case
of code rate one-half, while pattern values of 2, encoding 2 bits per DNA
character, provide one less bit. By construction the code rate is one-half the
average of the integers in the pattern. The column in the table labeled Pok
will be explained in Section 4.6.
Decoding follows exactly the same pattern. Guessing a two-bit vi spawns
12 child hypotheses, while guessing a zero-bit vi spawns only 3.
4.6 Choice of, And Trade-Offs Among, Parameters
For encoding, the parameter choices are (i) the choice of code rate and vari-
able bit pattern (as in Table 1), the default case being code rate 0.5; (ii) the
number q > 0 of low-order bits of position index in the hash; (iii) the number
r > 0 of previous message bits in the hash; (iv) the number s ≥ 0 of salt bits;
and (v) the number n ≥ 0 of initial message bits to be protected by salt.
It might at first seem that bigger is better for both q and r, but this is
not the case. Restricting r to a smaller value better allows the heap search to
recover from previous errors, basically by finding an acasual (i.e., “wrong”)
path that coincidentally puts it back on track. As for q, restricting it to a
smaller value could be useful in case one desires the capability of jumping
into the middle of an undecoded message: The heap can then be initialized
with all possible values of I and B (cf. Figure 2). For our system design,
Section 3, this is not a necessary, or useful, capability, however. For the
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baseline validation experiments in Section 5, we take q = 10, r = 8, n = 16
or 24.
For decoding, we need to know the encoding parameters, and must now
also choose values for Psub, Pdel, Pins, and Pok. While, conceptually, these are
negative log probabilities of the occurrence of the different kinds of errors
(which can be known only after the fact), we adopt a more empirical ap-
proach. First, we take Psub = Pdel = Pins to give the HEDGES decoding
algorithm equal robustness against all three kinds of errors. Second, we note
that the search for shortest path is invariant under applying the same linear
(or affine) transformation to all four P ’s. So, without loss of generality, we
may take Psub = Pdel = Pins = 1, leaving Pok as the only free parameter. We
determine optimal (or at least good) values for Pok by numerical experiment.
We find that the optimal Pok depends only negligibly on the encoding pa-
rameters q and r, and only slightly on the length L of the strand, but it does
depend on the code rate. Good values for various code rates are given in the
third column of Table 1.
Implicitly, the choice of Pok reflects a tradeoff between computational
workload and decode failure probability. Pok that is too negative results in too
greedy a search, which is fast but can get stuck in a blind alley that requires
us to declare the rest of the strand as an erasure (hence its dependence on
strand length). On the other hand, Pok that is insufficiently negative results
in a too large, potentially exponential, expansion of the size of the heap.
Happily, there is an accessible range of workable values. Changes of ∼ 10%
in Pok matter little, and our values are implicitly tuned for best performance
on strand lengths in the range ∼ 100 to ∼ 1000.
In Section 4.3 above we limited the guesses for ∆ to only {−1, 0, 1} so as
to limit the expansion of the heap. This results in more than one consecutive
insertion or deletion being improperly scored. For example, without the
possibility of skew ∆ = −2, the shortest available path through two deletions
. . . DD . . . declares a spurious substitution . . . DSD . . .. In practice, this
makes little difference, because double deletions are significantly less common
than single deletions, and because other, completely incorrect, paths score
much worse.
It is an important point that choosing any set of decode parameters is not
an irrevocable choice. Given a DNA message, one can make multiple tries,
varying the decode parameters adaptively until acceptable performance is
achieved. One can evaluate success by running time and by the count of
errors needing correction by the outer R-S code. The parameter values that
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we suggest may be viewed as starting points.
5 Computer Validation Experiments
We have implemented HEDGES in C++ code, with also a Python interface
for convenience. (We similarly implemented a compatible Python interface
to the published “Schifra” implementation of Reed-Solomon.[20]) For tests
on individual strands of length L, we encode a random stream of message
bits and degrade the resulting codestream by errors with a specified Poisson-
random total rate, divided equally among the three error types, substitution,
insertion, and deletion. Unless otherwise stated the HEDGES code rate is
one-half.
Figure 4: Hypotheses expended (heap size) in decoding a long strand with
5% DNA character errors. Ten examples are shown each of successful decodes
(blue) and unsuccessful decodes (red). Unsuccessful decodes are declared as
erasures. Although here shown equally, red cases are actually much rarer
than the blue (see also Figure 5).
We allow each decode a “hypothesis budget”, that is, a maximum size to
which the heap is allowed to expand. If, along a strand, a decode exceeds
its budget, we declare subsequent message bits in that strand to be erasures.
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Figure 4 shows examples of how decodes expend their budget along a long
strand. There is a sharp bifurcation between decodable strands, which typ-
ically expend . 100 hypotheses per decoded bit, and undecodable strands,
which go into blind alleys and readily expend & 1000 hypotheses per de-
coded bit. The figure shows 10 selected examples of each type. In practice
undecodable strands are much rarer than decodable ones.
Figure 5: HEDGES decode failure rates vs. strand length of a half-rate code
as a function of total DNA error rate (3%, 5%, 10%) and hypothesis budget
(1.25 × 105, 2.5 × 105, 5 × 105, 1 × 106). Failure rates . 10−2 are fully
correctable by the concatenated Reed-Solomon code.
Figure 5 shows decode failure rates actually achieved by a half-rate code,
as a function of length of strand, input total error rate, and hypothesis bud-
get. One sees that, for strand lengths in the useful range 100–1000, failure
rates . 10−2 are readily achievable for total input error rates up to ∼ 5%.
For an input error rate of 3%, strand lengths up to 104 are feasible. Failure
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rates . 10−2 are easily absorbed as erasures in the error budget of an outer,
interleaved Reed-Solomon code (see below, this section).
In the case of a successful decode, there may remain uncorrected substi-
tution errors. Figure 6 shows the uncorrected (output) bit, and byte, error
rates along strands of length 240 for the three input codestream character
error rates 3%, 5%, and 10%. The uncorrected error rates vary along the
strand for two reasons: First, for this experiment, we applied salt protection
to the first 24 message bits (that is, 24 characters for the half-rate code). One
sees that this worked as advertised: There were no uncorrected errors in the
first 24 bits. Second, uncorrected error rates are seen to rise as the length of
the strand is approached. Although undesirable, this is an inevitable feature
of HEDGES. As the strand end is approached, there are fewer redundancy
checks available downstream, making the greedy search algorithm less selec-
tive. Our system design (Section 3) allows for specifying some number of
“runout” bits at the ends of the strands, encoding zeros and not part of the
message packet. How much runout to allow depends on how much one wants
to burden the R-S error budget. For this numerical experiment, we assumed
24 runout bits.
It is notable that the byte error rates in Figure 6 are only ≈ 3 times the
bit error rates, rather than . 8 times (depending on the bit error rate) if the
errors were randomly distributed. This shows that HEDGES’s uncorrected
errors are bursty, which is good for input to R-S and gains some overall
efficiency.
Exclusive of the salt-protected and runout regions, the uncorrected bit
error rates for this experiment are about 1 × 10−3, 3.5 × 10−3, 2 × 10−2 for
input error rates 3%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The corresponding byte
error rates are 3× 10−3, 1× 10−2, and 6× 10−2.
What level of uncorrected errors may we allow to get through to the
R-S outer code, with a high probability that they will there be corrected?
RS(255, 223) is able to correct 16 byte-errors, or any combination of byte
errors and erasures whose equivalent number is
Nequiv = (byte errors) + 0.5× (byte erasures) ≤ 16
The probability of failure to completely correct 255 bytes, for Poisson random
byte errors/erasures is thus the cumulative probability
Pfailure = PoissonCDF(k > 16 |λ = 255Pequiv) (6)
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where Pequiv is the byte error rate (B.e.r.) plus half the erasure rate. As men-
tioned above, we interleave and apply the R-S code diagonally (see Figure 1)
because (i) strands may be missing, (ii) byte errors along a single strand may
be bursty, and (iii) it is found experimentally that sequencing and synthesis
error rates can be different (often larger) near to the end of strands. The
interleaved diagonal pattern ensures that no single 255 length R-S packet
gets handicapped by an error rate much different than the average across the
whole strand, and that its number of errors will be distributed with (close
to) Poisson statistics. Table 2 evaluates equation (6) for relevant values of
Pequiv. One sees that a value Pequiv . 1% are adequate to guarantee error-free
decoding of messages of gigabyte length or longer.
Pequiv Pfailure
0.005 5.25× 10−14
0.010 2.08× 10−9
0.020 2.53× 10−5
0.030 2.39× 10−3
0.040 3.16× 10−2
Table 2: Probability that the outer code RS(255, 223) fails to correct 100%
of message errors as a function of Pequiv, the inner-code HEDGES output
byte error rate (plus half the erasure rate). One sees that Pequiv < 0.01 is
sufficient for error-free decoding of gigabyte-length messages.
Figure 7 now shows the results of a numerical experiment evaluating
Pequiv as a function of input DNA error rates for six different code rates. The
evaluation was done with strand length L = 300 (as a variant of the value
L = 240 in Figure 6), no salt protection, and 2 bytes of runout on each strand
(errors in which are not counted). Using Table 2, one sees that a DNA error
rate of about 1% is correctable at code rate 3/4 with probability effectively
1, increasing to a correctable error rate of about 15% at code rate 1/6.
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Figure 6: Remaining uncorrected substitution error rates after HEDGES
decoding, excluding the erasures implied by Figure 5. For this numerical
experiment, strands of length 240 bases were encoded with a half-rate code,
with 24 initial bits protected by salt (see Section 4.4). Strand averages (ex-
clusive of protected and runout regions) are shown at the left edge of the
figure. Error rates rise in the runout region, because fewer downstream bits
of redundancy are available. Strand average Byte error rates . 10−2 are
readily corrected by the outer Reed-Solomon code.
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Figure 7: Effective rate of uncorrected byte errors after HEDGES decod-
ing for 6 code rates. The curves give values Pequiv that, after correction by
the outer Reed-Solomon code, give the error rates labeled on the horizontal
dotted lines (values from Table 2). Intersections with the dotted lines cor-
respond to final error rates (post Reed-Solomon) shown on the right. This
numerical experiment is done with strand length L = 300, no salt protection,
and 2 bytes of runout (see text).
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6 Channel Capacity re Shannon Limit
We might wonder how close the results of Figure 7 come to the absolute
bound of the Shannon limiting channel capacity [1]. Unfortunately, comput-
ing the Shannon limit for even the simplest case of a binary deletion channel,
let alone channels with also insertions and substitutions, remains a difficult
unsolved problem [6, 22]. Still, it is possible to get some idea by making an
informed estimate as follows.
Figure 8: Comparison of the channel capacity achieved with HEDGES to an
estimate of the Shannon limiting capacity. The dots show the greatest of the
capacities achieved by the various code rates in Table 1. As expected, the
smaller code rates become optimal for the larger input error rates. Codes
with r > 0.75 (not tried) would give even better performance at the smallest
error rates (left side of of the graph).
A remarkable theorem of Shannon [21] proves that the channel capacity of
a forward error-corrected channel is identical to that of a “feedback channel,”
where the sender gets to see (error-free) what was actually received, and then
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send correcting information post hoc. We can thus estimate channel capacity
by reducing the maximum capacity (for DNA, 2 bits per character) by the
entropy of the necessary correction messages. The reason that this is an
estimate only (strictly, a lower bound), is that we may not be sending the
optimally short correction messages, especially as the error rate becomes
large.
In our case, suppose p is the character error rate. As before, assume
equal probabilities p/3 for the three kinds of errors. Then we can estimate
the Shannon limit of the channel as
CShannon = 2− [H2(p) + p log2 3 + 13p log2 4 + 13p log2 3] (7)
where H2 is the entropy of a binary choice,
H2(p) ≡ −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) (8)
In equation (7), the first term in brackets is the cost of communicating
whether a particular code character marks the position of an error. The
second term is the cost of telling which kind of error (substitution, deletion,
insertion). The third term is the cost of communicating the missing character
in a deletion. The fourth is the similar cost for a substitution. While strictly
only a lower bound, analogous results for binary deletion channels [22] sug-
gest that equation (7) is actually a good approximation for small values of
p.
We now calculate the channel capacity actually achievable with HEDGES
by the relation
CHEDGES = 2× (code rate)× [1−H2(pequiv)] (9)
Here the factor 2 is the number of bits per DNA character, while the factor in
square brackets reflects the loss of channel capacity to an (assumed perfect)
concatenated outer code that corrects all of HEDGES’ uncorrected bit errors.
Figure 8 shows the results of the comparison. One sees that HEDGES
achieves a respectable fraction, & 0.5, of the estimated Shannon limit for
DNA character error rates up to 20%.
7 Discussion
Previous work on DNA information storage, despite the increasing sophisti-
cation of methods, has largely ignored the possibility of directly correcting
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insertion and deletion errors by an appropriate error-correcting code. In-
stead, most previous work has relied on multiple sequence alignment after
sequencing DNA messages to significant depths. In effect, though not always
acknowledged, this method is an inefficient multiple-repetition code.
This paper developed a coding technique, termed HEDGES, for the direct
correction of insertions and deletions, along with substitutions, workable with
(combined) DNA character error rates up to 20%, and at a respectable frac-
tion of the Shannon information limit. The code, HEDGES, was optimized
for use as the inner code in an overall design with an outer concatenated code
that will generally be interleaved across DNA strands. Used with HEDGES,
the outer code need not be indel-aware and can be a conventional ECC like
Reed-Solomon.
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